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By letter of 28 June 1990 the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy requested authorization to draw up a report on completion of 
the internal market: approximation of indirect taxation in the Community up to 
1993 and thereafter. 
At the sitting of 8 October 1990 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that the committee had been authorized to report on this subject. 
At its meeting of 16 October 1990 the committee appointed Mr Patterson 
rapporteur. 
At its meetings of 5-7 November 1990, 5-7 February 1991, 18-20 March 1991, 24-
25 April 1991, 14 May 1991 and 29-31 May 1991 the Committee considered the 
draft repor1. 
At the last meeting, 29-31 May 1991, it adopted the motion for a resolution 
unopposed with two abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Beumer (Chairman), Desmond (Vice-
Chairman), Patteraon (rapporteur), Beazley P., Bofill Abeilhe, Cassidy, Colom 
I Naval, Cooney (for Bernard-Reymond) Cox, De Piccoli, Di Rupo (for Caud~on), 
Frierich, Herman, Hoppenstedt, Megret, Merz, Metten, Nielsen (for De Donnea), 
Porto (for Punset I Casals), Read, Riska!r Petersen, Rogalla, Roumeliotis, 
Sboarina, Seal, Siso Cruellas, Tongue, von Wogau 
The report was tabled on 30 May 1991. 
'l'he deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A. 
DRAFT MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
on completion of the internal market: approximation of indirect taxation in 
the Community up to 1993 and thereafter 
The European Parliament, 
having regard to the Communication from the Commission of 26 August 1987 
(COM(87) 0320 final), 
having regard to Articles 8a and 17 of the Single European Act, 
taking into account the evidence presented to its Committee on Economic 
and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy on 18-20 April, 21 June and 12 
July 1988 (PE 123.347), 
having regard to the initial report of its Committee on Economic and 
Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy (A2-0315/88), 
noting the Communication from the Commission of 14 June 1989 (COM(89) 0260 
final), 
recalling its resolution of 25 October 1989, 
in the light of the Communication from the Commission of 3 November 1989 
(COM(89) 0551 final) and its most recent proposals in the field of 
indirect taxation (COM(90) 0182 final), COM(90) 0183 final and COM(90) 
0430-0434 inclusive), 
t·ecalling the report from its Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs 
and Industrial Policy on the transitional arrangements for Value Added Tax 
(PE 143.204/fin.) and its resolution of 20 November 1990, 
having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary 
Affairs and Industrial Policy (A3-0156/91), 
1. re-affirms that fiscal frontiers within the Community must be abolished, 
both to achieve the gains outlined in the Cecchini Report, and to create 
an area "without internal frontiers" in accordance with the Single 
European Act; 
2. observes that, in the case of Value Added Tax, this cannot be fully 
achieved until the system of charging tax on imports and remitting tax on 
exports in trade between Member States is ended; 
3. in consequence, has accepted the transitional arrangements for a common 
system of Value Added Tax on the understanding that both Commission and 
Councll are committed to the full abolition of fiscal frontiers at the 
earliest possible date; 
4. notes that a system based on charging Value Added Tax in, and at the rate 
of, the country of origin will result in transfers of revenue to Member 
States wlth net surpluses on internal Community trade; and therefore asks 
Commission and Council either to agree to the payment of all VAT revenues 
into the Community Budget, or to give immediate priority to devising a 
workable and acceptable VAT clearing system; 
5. draws attention to the fact that some 95' of trade between Member States 
takes place between VAT-registered bodies, where differences in tax rates, 
even after the complete abolition of fiscal frontiers, cannot greatly 
distort competition; 
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6. also draws attention to the evidence showing that differences in VAT rates 
play only a limited part, overall, in determining price differences 
between Member States; 
7. observes that significant distortions of competition might have arisen in 
the case of sales to bodies exempt from Value Added Tax, but that this 
danger will now be removed; 
8. concludes that any distortions of competition as a result of differences 
in VAT rates will arise largely on sales to individual final consumers, 
particularly where these take place across certain frontiers (e.g. 
Denmark/Germany) and in the case of high-value, low volume goods; 
9. believes, however, that the temptation to counter such possibilities by 
retaining VAT controls on cross-border purchases by individuals should be 
resisted; and demands that travellers' VAT-paid allowance within the 
Community should become infinite on 1 January 1993, as reaffirmed by the 
Commission in its Communication of 14 June 1989; 
10. observes that the removal of limitations on cross-border purchases will to 
some extent bring the VAT systems of Member States into competition with 
each other, and create pressures for the convergence of rates; 
11. observes, also, that this convergence might be achieved either through the 
operation of market forces; or through some prior approximation or 
harmonization of rates; believes, however, that convergence of VAT rates 
is preferable through some prior approximation or harmonization; 
12. calls on the Commission to investigate the effect that the removal of 
limitations on cross-border purchases by individuals, without prior 
approximation of rates, would have on trading patterns in border areas; 
13. meanwhile, is aware that the operation of market forces on their own is 
liable to produce convergence on the lowest tax levels and create the 
danger of a continuing competitive downward pressure on rates; 
14. concludes that at least a minimum standard rate of VAT will have to be 
agreed; 
15. notes, however, that the fixing of single, target rates of tax in the case 
of either VAT or excise duties, or of an upper limit (i.e. a band) in the 
case of VAT, will create additional constraints on the fiscal policies of 
Member States, which will have implications going beyond the field of 
indirect taxation; 
16. also notes that the determination of tax rates at Community level raises 
important institutional questions, in particular the voting system to be 
used in Council and the participation of the European Parliament; 
17. supports an obligatory reduced rate VAT on certain basic goods, the 
purchase of which accounts for a high proportion of the expenditure of 
lower-income families; 
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18. observes that differing VAT rates on most of these goods - for example, 
fuel for household heating and cooking, and basic foodstuffs - are 
unlikely to give rise to cross-frontier shopping; 
19. believes, therefore, that a zero rate of VAT should be a valid reduced 
rate on such goods; 
20. calls on the Commission to publish as extensive a list as possible of 
goods and services which might be taxed, pursuant to the principle of 
subsidiarity, at the reduced rate of VAT; 
21 . noting the Commission proposal that 'books, newspapers and periodicals' 
should be taxed at the reduced rate of VAT, believes that such a rate 
should apply only if such publications are in printed form; 
22. affirms that the rates of VAT to be introduced should be those adopted in 
the Parliament's opinion in the report by Mr METTEN (PE 148.345) on the 
proposal for a Directive on the approximation of VAT rates (COM(87) 0321 
final); 
23. calls for the speedy adoption by Council of the Directive on the VAT 
treatment of second-hand goods and works of art; 
24. calls on the Commisison to investigate what impact there would be, notably 
on SMUs, if undertakings established in several Member States were 
regarded as a single enterprise for VAT purposes, and to take any action 
necessary to remove obstacles to cross-frontier co-operation in this 
context; 
25. calls on the Commission, in its negotiations with the EFTA countries on 
the European Economic Space, to propose that exemption from duty should be 
ended throughout the European Economic Space; 
26. calls on the Commission to propose an adequate rate of tax from the point 
of view of the environment on the use of non-renewable sources of energy 
which are not covered by the present proposals; 
27. calls on the Commission to ensure that account is taken in all measures to 
harmonize VAT and excise duties of the ecological impact of such measures; 
28. welcomes, at last, the Commission's proposals for the movement within the 
Community of goods subject to excise duties; 
29. in contrast, is sceptical as to whether early agreement is possible on 
either the structures or the rates of duty on tobacco products and 
alcoholic beverages; 
30. draws attention, in this context, to the considerable effects which 
harmonization of these excise duties would have within Member States on 
revenues, price levels, patterns of consumption, employment and financial 
and budgetary policy; 
31. believes, however, that continuing disparities in the rates of excise 
duties after 31 December 1992 A!:§ compatible with the abolition of tax 
checks at internal Community frontiers; 
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32. in particular, believes that significant tax avoidance can be prevented 
through limiting the bulk movement of excisable goods to within the duty-
suspension system, and by controlling the resale in high-tax Member States 
of excisable goods bought duty-paid in low-tax countries; 
33. consequently calls for personal tax-paid allowances for excisable goods to 
become infinite on 1 January 1993, as in the case of VAT; 
34. is of the opinion that a continuation of "duty-free" sales on intra-
Community journeys by air or sea is compatible with the abolition of 
frontier checks on travellers; 
35. draws attention to the danger of a "two-speed Europe" which would arise if 
certain Member States were to opt out of the fiscal aspects of 1992; and 
believes that the temptation to solve the problems of particular Member 
States through derogations and/or exemptions should be resisted; 
36. instructs its President to forward this report to the Council and 
Commission and to the parliaments of the Member States. 
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B. 
EXPLANATORY STATIMINT 
1 • HISTORICAL INTROQJ}C1'ION 
Article 99 of the original EEC Treaty required the Commission to "consider how 
the legislation of the various Member States concerning turnover taxes, excise 
duties and other forms of indirect taxation • • • can be harmonized in the 
interests of the Common Market." Under this provision, the 1st and 2nd VAT 
Directives of 1967 introduced a common system of Value Added Tax. Agreement on 
the Community's "own resources" led to the 6th VAT Directive of 1977, the 
object of which was to harmonize the VAT base so that "application of the 
Community rate to taxable transactions leads to comparable results in all 
Member States". 
Meanwhile, attempts were also made to act in the field of excise duties. A 
start was made on harmonizing the structure of tobacco taxes in 1972, but the 
process soon stalled at its second phase. There was a similar lack of progress 
in the fields of alcoholic beverages and hydrocarbon oils. 
In 1987, however, Article 17 of the Single European Act replaced Article 99. 
Under this "the Council shall, acting unanimously on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, adopt provisions for 
the harmonization of legislation concerning turnover taxes, excise duties and 
other forms of indirect taxation to the extent that such harmonization is 
necessary to ensure the establishment and functioning of the Internal Market 
within the time-limit laid down in Article 8a." (i.e. by 31 December 1992). 
In June 1985, the Commission published its Internal Market White Paper1, Part 
nr of which outlined the case for "the removal of fiscal barriers". The 
annexed timetable for the completion of the Internal Market listed 27 
proposals in the tax field. Half of these ware already on the table2. Among 
the new proposals forecast was a "standstill" on indirect tax rates, which was 
published the following yaar3, but was subsequently replaced by the 
Convergence Directive (see below). 
The Milan summit of June 1985 invited the Council of Economic and Finance 
Ministers (ECOFIN) to examine what action was needed in the tax area. ECOFIN 
passed this task on to "a high-level group of fiscal experts", who reported in 
1 COM(85) 0310 of June 1985. 
2 VAT Directives: the 7th (works of art and second-hand goods), which was 
subsequently replaced, in 1988, by COM(88) 0846 final; 12th (non-
eligible expenditure) COM(82) 0870; 13th (tax refunds); 14th (deferred 
payments on importing, COM(82) 0402, which was later withdrawn; 16th 
(VA'l'-paid imports by final consumers) COM(84) 0318 and COM(86) 0163; 
17th. (temporary importation) COM(84) 0412; and the 18th and 19th, 
COM(84) 0649 (amended proposal C0~87) 0272) and COM(84) 0648 (amended 
proposal COM(87) 0315), which consisted of various "tiding up" 
amendments to the 6th. J!;xcise proposals: alcoholic beverages COM(72) 
0225, COM(82) 0153, COM(85) 0150, COM(85) 0151; wine tax COM(72) 0225; 
cigarettes COM(80) 0069; mineral oils COM(73) 1234. 
3 COM(85) 0606 and COM(87) 0017. 
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June of 1986. The group's main conclusion was that no firm conclusion was 
possible until detailed proposals were available. 
The 1987 tax package 
Accordingly, in August 1987, the Commission published eight tax documents: 
The Global Communication 
VAT Rates Directive 
Fiscal Frontiers Directive 
Clearing Mechanism Working Document 
Convergence Directive 
Cigarettes Directive 
Manufactured Tobacco Directive 
Mineral Oils Directive 
Alcoholic Beverages Directive 
COM(87) 0320 final 
COM(87) 0321 final 
COM(87) 0322 final 
COH(87) 0323 final 
COM(87) 0324 final 
COM(87) 0325 final 
COM(87) 0326 final 
COM(87) 0327 final 
COM(87) 0328 final 
These were referred for study to the Community's Economic Policy Committee, 
which published a report in April 19884. 
During late 1987 and early 1988, the European Parliament's Economic Committee 
held a series of meetings to exchange views with delegations from the national 
parliaments. Public hearings took place on the 18-20 April; on 21 June~ and on 
12 July. The Committee also received substantial written evidence . As a 
result of this work, the Committee found itself in a position to adopt a 
number of opinions on the Commission texts during at its meeting of 1 and 2 
December 1988: Global (rapp. IIR G.B.PA'l'TBRSOR, A2-0315/88); VAT Rates (rapp. 
MR A.METTEN A2-0308/88); Fiscal Frontiers (rapp. MR K.DB GUCHT, A2-0320/88); 
Clearing Mechanism (rapp. MR K.DB GUCHT, A2-0314/88). 
The Economic and Social Committee had meanwhile also adopted its opinions at 
its plenary sitting of 6-7 July 19886. 
The events of 1989 and 1990 
It had originally been intended that Parliament's tax reports would be debated 
and voted on at the December 1988 plenary. However, following the news that 
the responsible Commissioner, Lord Cockfield, was to be replaced at the end of 
the year, the debate was postponed until January 1989. 
A full debate did, indeed, take place on 17 January (OJ 2-373). It immediately 
became clear, however, that the incoming Commissioner, Christiane Scrivener, 
was contemplating substantial revisions to the proposals. Since Parliament has 
only one reading on legislation in the tax field, and since there was no 
guarantee of re-consultation on any revised proposals, Parliament decided to 
keep its powder dry, and took no final vote. The Commission's new thinking was 
eventually outlined in its Communication of 14 JUne 19897, which advocated a 
more flexible approach in the fields of both VAT and excise duties. 
4 Report to the Council and Commission from the European Communi ties 
Economic Policy Committee of 6 April 1988 (II/066/2/88). 
5 Some of this has been published (PE 123.347). 
6 EC0/104 to 112. 
7 COM(89) 0260 final. 
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Meanwhile, little progress had been made in Council. In July, however, the 
incoming French Presidency realized that unless decisions on the system for 
handling VAT and excise duties on intra-Community trade could be reached by 
the end of 1990, there would be no chance of ending tax collection at 
frontiers by 1993. ECOFIN rapidly reached the conclusion that agreement on the 
Commission's VAT proposals could not be reached in time. Following an 
examination of the VAT dossier by a high-level working party, an alternative 
was devised. This was endorsed by the European Council at in December 1989. 
The position of the Council formed the basis of two revised Commission 
proposals, published on 19 June 1990: 
"Transitional Arrangements" Directive 
"Administrative Cooperation" Regulation 
OOH(90) 0182 final 
OOH(90) 0183 final 
Parliament's Economic Committee adopted opinions on these proposals ori the 
basis of Reports by MR G.PUCHS (A3-0271/90 of 7 ~ 1990) and MR K.DE 
GUCHT (A3-0279/90 of 6 November 1990), which were voted through by Parliament 
at its November 1990 plenary sitting. The proposals were also adopted by 
Council before the end of the year. 
Excise duties 
Meanwhile, the Commission had also produced revised proposals in the field of 
excise duties. At the end of 1989, amended versions of the existing proposals 
on excise-duty rates were published, together with a Communication on the 
Commission's new approach: 
Hew Comllission App.t·oach 
Tobacco products (rates of duties) 
Mineral oils (rates of duties) 
Alcohol (rates of duties) 
COM(89) 0551 final 
COM(89) 0525 final 
OOM(89) 0526 final 
COM(89) 0527 final 
Finally, in late 1990 and early 1991 came the long-awaited proposals on the 
movement of excisable goods, and new proposals on the structure of excises. 
Communication on regime and structures 
General arrangements (bonded warehouses) 
Alcohol (structures of duties) 
Tobacco (structures of duties) 
Mineral Oils (structures of duties) 
Mineral Oils (rates of duties) 
2 • FISCAL FRON'l'IERS 
COM(90) 0430 final 
COM(90) 0431 final 
COM(90) 0432 final 
COM(90) 0433 final 
COM(90) 0434 final 
COM(91) 0043 
ln the Global Communication, the Commission pointed out that "fiscal checks 
feature prominently among the functi-ons carried out at the Community's 
internal frontiers". The costs of carrying out such functions were later 
quantified in the cecchini Report of 19888. Were customs formalities at 
internal frontiers to be abolished, the immediate gain would be a 0. 4% 
increase in Community GDP, a 1' fall in consumer prices and 200, 000 extra 
8 "The European Challenge 1992. The benefits of a Single Market" by Paolo 
Cecchini and "European Economy" no.35 of March 1988 (ISBN 0379-0991). 
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jobs. In addition, the elimination of fiscal frontiers would contribute to the 
long-term dynamic effects of creating the Single Market. 
As the report of the Economic Policy Committee noted, however, change also 
involved penalties. "In evaluating the Commission's approach it is important 
to compare the administrative costs arising ... from present frontier controls 
with the costs which would result from the implementation of the Commission's 
proposals." In particular, the proposal to change the levying of VAT on intra-
Community trade from a "destination" to an "origin" basis, involving as it did 
the creation of VAT clearing system, was heavily criticized by national 
administrations. Hence the eventual adoption instead of the "transitional" 
arrangements, which retain the destination principle, but move the tax point 
from frontiers to the place of delivery. 
Similarly, in the case of excise duties, the original Commission proposals for 
the complete harmonization of rates raised a storm of protest. Here, the 
feared costs were not so much administrative as economic: a loss of tax 
revenue in high-tax countries, a rise in inflation and unemployment in low-tax 
countries. Even the more modest proposals of 1990 for minimum rates are being 
similarly criticized (see section 4). 
The abolition of tax controls at frontiers. however. is not the same thing as 
the abolition of fiscal frontiers. Though, under the transitional VAT regime, 
tax controls at frontiers will end, goods moving from (say) France to the 
United Kingdom will still be "de-taxed" (i.e. zero rated) in France and "re-
taxed" when arriving at their Ul< destination. For the "fiscal frontier" to 
disappear, they would have to be treated like goods moving from Scotland to 
England. It is for this reason that, from the 2nd. VAT Directive onwards, "de-
taxing/re-taxing" has been considered only a temporary arrangement. 
Moving to the alternative "origin" system, however, raises the issue of 
revenue alloc~tion. VAT is a general consumption tax, and in all cases is paid 
by the final consumer, since input tax is rebated at earlier stages. Under the 
"destination" principle, the whole of the tax paid also accrues to that 
consumer's national Exchequer. Under the "origin" system, however, ~ of 
the revenue will accrue to Exchequers in other Member States. 
If the trade ot all Member States in VAT-rated goods were in perfect balance, 
this would not matter. In practice, a move to the origin system would probably 
result in substantial transfers of revenue. The Commission's own calculations 
showed a substantial gain for Germany and the Benelux countries at the expense 
of the rest9. A number of solutions are possible: 
i) Do nothing, and accept the transfers of revenue. 
ii) Follow the England-Scotland model: trade imbalances do not matter, since 
all VAT goes to the UK Exchequer. Similarly, all VAT could accrue to the 
Community Budget. 
iii) Re-allocate revenues between Member States on the basis of estimated 
trade flows. 
iv) Re-allocate revenues on the basis of actual VAT returns, administered by 
a central Clearing System. 
-----------
9 See COM(87) 0323 final. 
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The first two solutions have hitherto proved politically unacceptable; and in 
the Council discussions held before adoption of the "transitional" Directive, 
it was felt that no statistical basis existed of sufficient accuracy to 
support either of the revenue re-allocation solutions. 
The transitional arrangements, however, themselves include harmonized data-
exchange systems for control purposes, which will increasingly be electronic 
in nature. Once these have been installed, and experience has been gained in 
their operation, a workable VAT revenue clearing system might become feasible. 
As the FUCHS Report noted, "the transitional period must acquire a momentum of 
its own, paving the way for the establishment of the definitive arrangements". 
3. IS APPROXIMATION OF TAX MTJS NECESSARY? 
'l'he abolition of fiscal frontiers within the Community will have the effect of 
bringing the tax systems of the Member States into competition with each 
other. Such competition might be expected to bring about a convergence of tax 
rates; but two schools of thought exist as to how this should take place: 
a) The "market" solution. The position of some Member States (notably the UK} 
is that no legislative measures are required to align tax rates. Once the 
fiscal frontiers had ceased to exist, market forces would exert the 
necessary pressure for alignment. Member States, however, would retain 
full sovereignty over the system; and would be able to calculate for 
themselves, for example, any trade-off between loss of revenue from tax 
cuts and loss of revenue through consumer shopping in lower-tax countries. 
'l'he steady fall in the French "luxury" rate of VAT from 33.3\ in 1987 to 
28\ (1988), then 25\ (1989/90} and now 22\ can be seen as an example of 
market forces already in action. 
b) Fisc;;al approximation/harmonization. The position of the Commission, as 
stated in the Global Communication, is that "the abol~tion of fiscal 
frontiers necessitates approximation of VAT and the main excise duties if 
unacceptable levels of distortion of competition, diversion of trade, and 
tax fraud are to be avoided". Based on US experience with Sales Tax (see 
Section 6}, the Commission proposal is for a maximum spread of 6\ between 
Member States (both for VAT alone and for excise plus VAT}. 
A number of factors are germane to the argument: 
iL 'l'he competitive effect of tax differences 
Evidence presented to the European Parliament's Economic Committee by the 
European consumers organization, BEUC1 0, indicated that, for many products, 
VAT played a very small part in determining price differences across internal 
frontiers. The price of a film, for example, was roughly the same on the two 
sides of the Channel, although the tax rate was 15\ on the UK side and 33.3% 
(at that time) in France. But in Belgium, it was 7.5\ cheaper than in the UK, 
although the tax rate was 25%. 
A more systematic study by the Commission 11 was also presented to the 
10 "BEUC's response" (BEUC 85/88} of 15 April 1988. 
11 "The role of VAT in explaining price differentials across the Member 
States". 
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Committee. Differences in indirect taxes (VAT and excise), it found, "account 
for only a quarter or thereabout of the price dispersion". "The part of price 
differentials explained by VAT differentials is rather modest (between 4% and 
8%). Therefore it can be concluded that differences in VAT rates are not the 
main cause, and not even a major one, of price differentials." 
The implication of these findings is that the abolition of fiscal frontiers, 
without prior approximation rates, would nQ.t., after all, lead to major 
distortions of competition. However, three 'caveats' must be entered: 
a) The importance of tax differences varies with product. The same BEUC 
survey, for example, found a closer relationship between tax and price in 
the case of compact cameras than in the case of films: in the UK tax 15%, 
price 105; in Belgium tax 25%, price 127; in France tax 33.3,, price 131. 
b) To the extent that current price differences are caused by various 
restraints on competition, and by market segmentation, the 1992 process as 
a whole might be expected to increase the pressure for price convergence. 
This would increase the significance of tax differences. 
c) Tax forms a major element in the price of excisable goods. 
'l'he whole issue, however, is further complicated by another factor: it is not 
possible to consider indirect taxation in isolation from tax systems as a 
whole. The relative weighting of indirect taxes and direct taxes on 
individuals, taxes on companies and social security charges varies markedly 
between Member States, with effects upon relative competitivity. 
Under the current system of remitting VAT inputs on exports, for example, the 
Danish tax system gives that country's exports a certain competitive 
advantage. A proportion of social expenditure, which in other Member States is 
financed out of direct contributions by employers and/or employees, is 
financed in Denmark out of the uniform 22' VAT. But this tax is remitted on 
exports, a possibility which does not exist for competitors. Is a competitive 
advantage achieved by having a ~ VAT rate; or by having a high VAT rate? 
It is not even the tax system alone that must be considered. The Boiteux 
Report prepared for the French Government in 198812 refers to analyses which 
discount completely variations in tax rates. In conditions of free competition 
"the differences in costs due to certain factors like fiscal charges will be 
offset by compenRating adjustments in other cost factors like the return on 
capital or on labour". 
li.1_ The effect of VAT registration 
At present some 96% of internal Community trade takes place between bodies 
registered for VAT. Under the destination principle, goods are exported free 
of tax; and taxed on import at the rate of the importing country. Under the 
origin system, goods would be exported at the rate of the exporting country; 
but this would be deducted as input tax by the importer, who would charge 
12 "Fiscalite et rnarche uniques europeen" by M.Boiteux and M.Achard 
(Ministere de 1' ecoonomie, des finances et de las privatisation, 
1988). 
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cus tamers at the ra le of the importing country. In neither case can 
differences in VAT rates have a major effect on competition. 
Similarly, excises are currently levied at the rate of the importing country, 
on arrival. Under the Commission proposals tax will be levied at the rate of 
the importing country as soon as the goods are released for consumption. 
Again, differences in tax rates can have no effect on competition. 
Competition problems (apart from those, of course, which result from fraud) 
could therefore only arise in relation to the St or so of goods which cross 
frontiers as a result of trading to the VAT-exempt sector (e.g. financial 
services, hospitals); or tax-paid goods carried by final consumers. 
The Boiteux Report considered the VAT-exempt sector, despite its limited role 
in trade, of er i tical importance. French hospitals or banks wishing to 
purchase high-value items like computers might have had a major incentive to 
buy in Luxembourg (12% VAT) or Germany (14\ VAT) rather than to purchase.from 
a domestic t:;upplier ( 18. 6t VAT) . This problem, however, has already been 
solved by bringing such bodies into the VAT system. 
Most recently, a study commissioned by the French Senate for their Committee 
on Finanee13 concluded that since "firms subject to VAT ... which recover the 
tax on their purchases, take into consideration only the prices net of tax", 
"the strict harmonization of VAT rates is not necessary". 
iii) Cross-border shopping 
An Mrs Robim;on points out in her Report for the Esc14 the "opportunity cost" 
ot cross-border shopping depends upon geography and product characteristics. 
As a rule-of··thumb, the higher the value in relation to transportability, and 
the greater the tax difference in relation to distance to be travelled, the 
more likely "tax shopping" will be. 
'Bona fide' travellers, it might be thought, account for so few cross-border 
movements of goods as not to affect competition at all. In that case, one 
might well ask why Member State governments have resisted so resolutely any 
substantial rise in the duty-paid allowances for travellers (not to be 
confused with the duty-free allowance)? Two Member States (Denmark and 
Ireland) have even tried to limit the allowances currently in force. 
en the case of cross-border shopping proper, a map of the Community, 
indicating tax rates, demonstrates clearly which are likely to be the most 
sensitive ggpgraphical factors. In the case of goods and services taxed at the 
standard rate of VAT, the most sensitive border is that between the North and 
South of I n~land ( 10 percentage points difference), followed by 
Denmark/Germany (8 points), and Belgium/Luxembourg (7 points). 
However, because certain categories of goods taxed at a standard rate in some 
countt·ies a:ce taxed at a "luxury" rate or at a "reduced" rate in others, there 
cu·e much gn~ater rate differences on some borders for certain goods. On the 
13 "The Economic Consequences of Fiscal Harmonization in Europe" (Summary 
published by the European Parliament, "National Parliaments" series 
No. 10, 1990) . 
14 EC0/104 of 18 May 1988. 
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Danish/German border, for example, the tax difference is 15 percentage points 
for those goods taxed at 7\ in Germany (e.g. food, books and works of art). 
On the Belgian/Luxembourg border the difference is 13 percentage points for 
goods taxed at 25\ in Belgium. In the case of cars the differences. are 
exacerbated in many cases by additional taxes. 
ivl tax categories 
In the area of product characteriStics, there are some goods and services 
which are unlikely to cross frontiers for tax reasons, if at all. Many of 
these, under the Commission's proposals, would come into the "reduced" rate 
VAT band: energy products for heating and lighting, supplies of water, 
internal passenger transport and newspapers (which tend to be language- or 
locality-specific). In these cases, wide variations in rates could exist 
without causing distortion. 
Theoretically, goods and services might be classified under three headings: 
i) Those which are "tax sensitive" - i.e. in the case of which tax 
differences might cause distortions of competition - smg which should be 
taxed at the standard rate (e.g. consumer electronics); 
ii) Goods which are tax sensitive, and which should be taxed at the reduced 
rate (e.g. pharmaceutical products?); and 
iii) Those which are not tax sensitive, and could be taxed at whatever rate 
Member States chose (e.g. immovable property, water and sewage services). 
In practice, a number of problems arise: for example, 
Which products or services should be specifically included in the reduced 
rate category? Charitable and "cultural" activities, for example, might be 
put in the reduced rate category. Alternatively, Member States might be 
left free to fix the tax rate, on the grounds that these are not tax 
sensitive as between Member States. 
Where a "product" is specifically included in the reduced rate category, 
how is it to be defined: for example, "food"? In some Member States (e.g. 
the UK) some food products are taxed at a reduced rate (bread); others at 
the standard rate (biscuits). Should the Community give definitions? 
How can it be ensured that competing products are included in the same.tax 
category, so that distortions of cpmpetition are avoided? For example, 
newspapers, periodicals and books might be thought to be competing 
products; yet Ireland taxes them at different rates. It can also be 
maintained that "publications" can take either a physical (e.g. books) or 
electronic (e.g. tape) form, and that it is illogical to place thein in 
different VAT categories. 
vl Maxima, Minima, Bands and Points 
Between proponents of "market" solutions and those like Boiteux, who believe 
that abolishing frontiers is unacceptable without almost identical rates, 
there seems to be a great gulf set. As the British Institute of Fiscal Studies 
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indicated in its analysis of the Commission's 1987 proposals15, however, the 
various positions are not as far apart as they might seem. 
The result of a "fiscal free-for-all", the Institute noted, would be a 
downward pressure on rates, which would continue "if low-tax Member States try 
to maintain the tax differential in their favour by reducing their own 
indirect tax rates still further". This scenario would be wonderful for 
consumers; less so for Finance Ministers. The IPS concluded that Member States 
would find it "strongly in their interests" to reach a prior agreement. 
The only agreement really necessary, however, would be on minimum rates. In 
the case of the Commission's proposal for a rate band, the downward pressure 
would tend to force rates to the lower limit anyway, making the upper limit 
irrelevant. In effect, this choice of minimum would amount to exactly the same 
thing as the Boiteux preference for a narrowly defined "target" rate. 
The IFS also saw no political justification for preventing any Member State 
from setting rates as high as they wished. "The revenue losses and the loss of 
retail business that might result from doing so would be borne entirely by the 
Member State concerned, and would not impose costs on the rest of the 
Community that would justify Community action". 
4. EXCISE DUTIES 
The danger of competition being distorted as a result of differences in VAT 
rates can, therefore, be exaggerated. Moreover, the spread of rates - as Lord 
Cockfield used to point out - is in the form of a normal distribution curve, 
with most countries' rates bunched at the centre. By contrast, the 
differences in rates of excise duties are vary large indeed: in some cases of 
the order of several 100\. Unlike VAT-rates, they are distributed in a 'u'-
curve, with most countries' rates either at the low or the high extreme. 
For this reason, the scope for distortion of competition in the case of 
excisable goods is theoretically considerable. Put in the form of an example: 
how does one prevent someone driving a lorry to Italy; stocking up in a 
supermarket - where the goods are, of course, tax paid - with wine (only 19\ 
VAT), spirits (excise 0.69 ECU a bottle plus VAT) and cigarettes (45.19 ECU a 
thousand VAT incl.); driving to Denmark; and selling the goods free of Danish 
tax on wine ( 1. 6 ECU per litre plus 22\ VAT), spirits ( 10.5 ECU per bottle 
plus VAT) and cigarettes (141.71 ECU par thousand, VAT incl.)? Either: 
a) frontier controls will have to continue; or 
b) excise duties will have to be aligned to the extent necessary to make the 
journey unprofitable; or 
c) other methods of control will have to be used. 
Of these, solution (a) would clearly be the least satisfactory. Just as one 
cannot be "a little bit pregnant", frontier controls either exist, or they do 
not. All luggage would have to be subject to control, whether the targets were 
taxable goods in general or just those subject to excise duties. 
15 "Fiscal harmonization: an analysis of the European Commission's 
proposals" (IFS Report 28, Feb.1988). 
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The 19Q7 proposals 
Solution (b) was the one originally chosen by the Commission. A complete 
harmonization of excise duties would have reduced the possible tax spread 
across frontiers to 6' (the VAT charged on top of excise). 
The Commission's Global Communication had declared that, since the objective 
was "not ... an ideal fiscal system for the Community, but a blueprint for the 
abolition of fiscal frontiers", nothing would be proposed that was not 
"strictly necessary for that purpose". Accordingly, the approach to excise 
duty rates was mathematical. For spirits, the proposed rate was the arithmetic 
average of tax on alcohol content. For wine, beer and intermediate products it 
took the average, weighted by GDP, on volume. For tobacco products it took the 
arithmetic average of the specific and 'ad valorem' elements separately; for 
petrol and LPG the arithmetic average; for fuel oil the weighted average. 
Even this apparent mathematical rigour was open to criticism, however. Taking 
the strict average was justified by the Commission as "the most equitable 
since it gives equal weight to each Member State, irrespective of size". Yet 
why it was "equitable" to give small, high-tax countries like Denmark and 
Ireland equal weight with larger economies was not immediately apparent. The 
weighted average, by contrast, had the advantage of being revenue-neutral for 
the Community as a whole - though not, of course, for individual countries. 
The Commission presumably hoped that a strictly mathematical approach would 
avoid the long-running disputes about the structure of excise duties: for 
example, the extent to which all forms of alcoholic beverages are in 
competition with each other (and should therefore be taxed on their alcoholic 
content alone); or the balance between the specific and 'ad valorem' elements 
of cigarette duty. As Parliament's committee hearings abundantly 
demonstrated, however, any such hopes were soon dashed. 
The main reason for the general rejection of the 1987 proposals, however, was 
the factor already noted by Lord Cockfield. In the case of VAT, most national 
rates are close to the average. In the case of excise duties, however, they 
are not; so the average is acceptable to nobody. 
The "flexible aporoach" 
The Commission's new proposals for excise duties are designed to circumvent 
this political stone-wall by introducing an "element of flexibility". Instead 
of single, harmonized rates, the proposals would set two rates: 
a) minimum rates, which would apply after 1992; and 
b) target rates, at a level similar to the original proposals, on which there 
would be long-term convergence. 
These proposals on rates are accompanied by a new attempt to harmonize the 
structure of excise duties. Two key questions arise: 
First, are these proposals sufficiently flexible to avoid rejection on the 
same grounds as those of 1987? Even in the case of the minimum rates, 
sensitive political issues are raised: the introduction of a wine tax in wine-
producing countries; and the specific/'ad valorem' ratio for cigarettes. 
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Secondly, are they sufficiently inflexible to permit the removal of fiscal 
frontiers? In the words of the Economic and Social Committee's opinion16, "are 
we .... not entitled to ask whether there is any real point in tinkering with 
present arrangements and encroaching on the autonomy of individual Member 
States when the results will in any case be of dubious or limited value?" It 
can certainly be argued that the introduction of the minimum rates - even if 
this can be effected by the end of 1992 - will reduce only very marginally 
the danger of "parallel trading" from low-tax to high-tax countries. 
An "admip.istrative" solution? 
Fortunately, the Commission's proposals for the general movement of excisable 
goods (COM(90)431) hold out some possibilities for ending frontier controls 
without the harmonization of excise duty rates (see report by MR.PATTERSON Al-
137/91). The proposal for "linked bonded warehouses" will mean that virtually 
all ~mercial movements of goods will take place within a tax-suspension 
regime. Fiscal frontiers will no longer exist; but neither will there be 
incentives to "parallel trading". 
This leaves goods moving outside the tax-suspension regime (i.e. duty-paid). 
The key problem is to separate goods carried by final consumers (travellers 
and individual shoppers) from potentially commercial movements. Though most 
commercial movements are likely to take place between authorized bonded 
warehouses, the possibility does exist that certain traders will wish to move 
tax-paid goods to another Member State for resale. In this case the proposal 
includes mechanisms for either a return to bond, or for the payment of duty in 
the country of consumption and the rebating of duty originally paid. 
The main danger is fraud: i.e. the commercial movement of goods, disguis~ as 
a movement by a final consumer. It will be crucial. therefore. to ensure that 
!ll!Gh a moyement gives rise to an offence. This might either be the act of 
resale itself (i.e. contravention of licencing laws in the case of selling 
alcoholic beverages in the UK); or contravention of rules governing the 
movement of excisable goods. The regime might be as follows: 
i) Final consumers would be free to take excise-paid goods across internal 
frontiers without further tax or control. 
ii) It would be an offence, however, to offer such goods for re-sale: in 
these circumstances, the carrier would automatically have lost the status 
of "final consumer". 
iii) The possibility would also exist of maintaining or introducing tax 
stamps or "banderoles" to control resale. The Commission proposals leave 
this up to the Member States themselves. Stamps, however, are expensive to 
administer; and might segment the market - though it could be argued in the 
case of cigarettes that the market has already been segmented by the 
language rules governing health warnings. 
~~drocarbon oils and transport 
16 OJ c 225/48 of 10 September 1990. 
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Such an administrative system should enable internal frontier checks to be 
abolished, without any harmonization of excise duties, as far as alcoholic 
beverages and tobacco products are concerned. In the case of hydrocarbon oils, 
however, there are additional reasons for aligning the rates of duty. 
Principal among these is the need to make progress in creating a common 
transport policy. It is sobering to recall that the original EEC Treaty 
singled out transport, together with agriculture, as one of the two key 
industries where a special Community regime was required. Yet - and in spite 
of Parliament having successfully taken the Council to the Court for its lack 
of action - only marginal progress has so far been achieved. 
'l'axation is one of the main reasons for this failure. Abolition of the complex 
quota system for road-haulage, for example, has been continuously postponed 
because the industry in countries with relatively high rates of duty on diesel 
(e.g.Germany: 381.39 ECU per 1000 litres) has feared "unfair" competition from 
those with lower rates (e.g. the Netherlands: 156.6 ECU per 1000 litres). To 
this has been added the problem of registration taxes, with various countries 
(e.g. Belgium and Germany) trying, from time to time, to impose special "rQad 
use" taxes on vehicles registered in other Member States. 
If the Single Market is to be a reality in the field of road transport, 
therefore, some harmonization of excise duties on hydrocarbon oils (and 
possibly of goods vehicle registration taxation too) seems unavoidable. In 
addition to the existing proposals, the Commission's legislative programme for 
1991 contains a further proposal on hydrocarbon tax rates. 
Considerations of competition policy are perhaps of less significance in the 
case of petrol than in the case of diesel. By contrast, environmental issues 
affect all fuel oils, and all vehicles. The Commission's 1991 programme.also 
contains a new proposal in this field. 
5. PQLITIGAL. ECONOMIC AND SQCIAL EFFECTS OF FISCAL APPROXIMATION 
In assessing the possible impact of the Commission proposals, and of 
alternatives, several economic and social factors need to be considered: the 
effects on revenues, prices, employment, patterns of consumption, health, etc. 
The most fundamental issue, however, is likely to be political: the 
consequences for the fiscal sovereignty of Member States. 
The most complete political, as well as technical, solution to the problem of 
fiscal frontiers would be to make both VAT and excises true "Community taxes": 
i.e. the revenues would accrue to the common Community Budget. This would have 
the added advantage that the resources available to the Community would make 
possible substantial compensating finance through the structural funds to 
areas adversely affected by "1992". Such a radical solution, however, has been 
rejected in favour of one which retains 12 separate tax authorities. "In terms 
of the integration process these proposals are retrograde steps," comments Mrs 
Robinson, "but have been adopted for political expediency". 
Any Community decisions in this area, however, would place some limit on the 
ability of national governments to change indirect tax rates. As a result, the 
scope for increasing tax revenue would increasingly be confined to direct 
taxation or social security contributions. The Boiteux Report warned that "the 
tax system of each country is the often complex product of national 
characteristics, in which economic, social and political factors play a part". 
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Yet the approximation of indirect tax nill would be bound to produce some 
convergence of systems; in particular, the proportion of indirect taxes in 
relation to taxation as a whole and to GDP. There is a wide diversity: 






of GDP \ of revenue 
Belgium 7.2 25.8 2.1 11.7 
Denmark 9.8 27.8 6.7 20.3 
Germany 5.9 29.3 2.4 16.0 
Greece 10.0 40.7 4.8 27.0 
Spain 5.6 25.4 2.0 19.5 
France 8.7 41.8 2.9 19.8 
It·eland 8. 1 24.4 6.9 24.1 
Italy 5.3 22.9 2.6 16.2 
Luxembourg 5.9 21.8 4.0 16.6 
Netherlands 7.9 30.5 2.7 13.8 
Portugal 6.6 31.8 
U.K. 6. 1 23.0 4.4 21.1 (OECD 1987) 
To the extent that tax approximation took place, there would also be a more 
precise political problem: once fixed, how could the rates be changed? 
Institutionally, the answers are contained in the Single European Act: 
decisions of this kind must be taken by Council, acting by unanimity. In 
practice, this could well mean that the indirect taxes of every Member State 
would be effectively frozen. 
Revenues. prices and employment 
Estimating the fiscal and economic effects of tax approximation presents a 
number of methodological problems. 
Simple, one-off effects are easy enough to calculate: the gain/loss in revenue 
or the increase/decrease in prices as a result of changes in a particular tax 
t·ate. Such figures, however, are of little long-term predictive value. Price 
changes will give rise to changes in the pattern of consumption; and, for 
these to be calculated, information is required on the price-elasticities of 
demand for the goods and services in question. The Institute of Fiscal Studies 
estimated, for example, that the Commission's 1987 wine proposals, assuming no 
change in the pattern of consumption, would have cost the UK Exchequer £3.9 
hi 11 ion. Allowing for increased consumption, however, the loss in revenue 
would have been only be £1.9 billion. 
The Commission's Global Communication gave a "tentative global qualitative 
assessment" of the revenue effects of its 1987 proposals. There would have 
been little change for Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. For France there 
would have been a small revenue loss. For Germany, Greece and the UK a small 
revenue increase. Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal would have experienced 
substantial increases; Denmark and Ireland substantial losses. So far, no 
f,igures have been published for the modified proposals. 
·rhe effects in terms of prices and - to some extent - employment are likely to 
be a mirror-image of revenue figures. Thus Danish and Irish consumers would 
have been the major beneficiaries of the 1987 proposals, as tax rates were 
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cut. By contrast, there would have been significant increases in the cost of 
living in Luxembourg, Spain and Portugal. 
Social effgcts; and the Zero VAT-rate issue 
Changes in tax rates and prices are not, of course, socially neutral. The 
proposed cuts in tax on alcohol and tobacco in the UK, Ireland and Denmark 
have been strongly attacked as contrary to policies on public health. On the 
other hand, such tax cuts would clearly be "progressive", in the sense that 
'they would reduce the cost of living of the poorer sections of society. By 
contrast, the steep rises in tobacco and alcohol prices in the Mediterranean 
countries would be "regressive", and would also have a significant effect on 
agricultural employment. 
One issue which illustrates this problem is the Zero Rate of VAT. This exists 
in some form in seven Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal and the UK), but is only important in Ireland, the UK and Portugal. 
The zero rate is often confused with VAT exemption. From the point of view of 
traders within the VAT system, a rate of zero must be treated in exactly the 
same way as a rate of 1\ or 5\ or 15\. VAT returns must be completed, and tax 
paid on inputs is recovered. In the case of exemption, by contrast, no VAT 
returns are needed, and no input tax is recovered. 
The effect for final consumers is likewise different. In the case of 
exemption, the consumer ~ pay some tax: i.e. on the exempt trader's inputs, 
which are passed on. Indeed, where there is an exempt stage in the middle of a 
chain, this can lead to double taxation (tax on tax), as in the case of some 
financial services. In the case of zero rating, all tax paid at preceding 
stages in rebated. From the technical point of view, therefore, zero is a tax 
rate like any other. Its purpose is to ensure that the final price is entirely 
free of tax, either open or hidden. 
Some critics of the zero rate have maintained that it is not a true tax rate, 
but a subsidy. This appears to be the view embodied in the 2nd. and 6th. VAT 
Directives, which state that VAT must be "high enough to permit in normal 
circumstances the deduction of tax paid at the preceding stage". Such a vie~, 
however, is illogical: it is impossible to reyeiye a rebite of VAT which has 
not already been pa~ at an earlier stage. 
What are the benefits of the zero rate of VAT? 
From a number of points of view, in particular administrative convenience and 
fiscal neutrality, the best form of VAT would be a single rate on all 
transactions (as is almost the case in Denmark) . However, such a system is 
clearly regressive, in the sense that it takes a hiqhgr proportion of income 
from the poor than from the rich. 
J 
In the case of income taxes, this defect is corrected by the device of higher 
nstes on higher incomes and various allowances. Indeed, it has been argued 
that the potential regressivity of VAT can be offset by greater progressivity 
in direct taxation. This, however, has its own drawbacks: notably disincentive 
effects, and the creation of "poverty traps". 
'1'he regressivity of VAT can, alternatively, be reduced through the mechanism 
of reduced (including zero) rates on certain goods. In the UK, for example, 
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the proportion of income spent on basic food by the less well-off is about 
double the national average. The zero-rating of this, together with gas and 
electricity for household use, has the effect of eliminating altogether the 
regressivity ot the VAT system in the UK. 
5 I DERQGMIONS 
The working assumption behind the Commission proposals is that all Member 
States will be participating. To what extent, though, should Member States be 
allowed derogations? 
The Global Communication discussed this question at some length. Member States 
"facing difficulties", it stated, "may well wish to be granted derogations." 
'l'he Commission itself had come to "the clear view" that it should not i1:self 
make any proposals, but should leave these to Member States. "Though the 
proliferation of derogation& would present serious problems that could 
threaten the operation of the Internal Market . . . the Commission would of 
course take a constructive part in the discussions ..• " 
The Communication added two important qualification, however: 
a) Since derogations may cause distortions of competition, they were "not 
simply a matter concerning the Member States asking for the derogation, but 
concern also the other Member States". 
b) "Derogation& always carry a cost (and) may lead neighbouring Member States 
to insist on the maintenance of frontier controls directed specifically 
against the Member State concerned." 
At the extreme, a particular Member State or Member States might be given a 
"global derogation" from the whole fiscal package. Were Denmark, the UK and 
Ireland excluded, for example, the problem of aligning indirect tax rates-
particularly excise duties - would be a great deal easier for the other nine. 
'fhis situation, however, would clearly mean a "two-speed Europe". 
lt now appears, in any case, that the Commission has revised its position on 
making specific proposals. The 1991 legislative programme now includes an 
imminent proposal on temporary derogation& to the 6th Directive (no doubt 
covering the Zero Rate issue outlined above). 
6. TilE l,l~ EXJ\MPLE 
The system of indirect taxation in the United States has been cited both in 
~~pport of the Commission's tax proposals, and as evidence against them. 
On the one hand, the 1987 White Paper argued that the "American experience is 
instructive". The maximum spread of Sales Tax rates in different States is 
7.5\ (Connecticut 7.5\, Alaska, Oregon, Montana, New Hampshire 0\). Across any 
cme state line it is 6.5\ (Washington 6.5\; Oregon 0\). These figures, as Lord 
Cockf ield pointed out, were the basis for the Commission's proposed maximum 
uplt:dd of 6\ for VAT17 
17 Answer to PQ by Mr Marshall (OJ Annex 2-363, March 1988). 
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On the other hand, it is claimed that the US experience indicates the 
compatibility of open fiscal frontiers and differing tax rates. For example, 
Peter Lilley (then a British Treasury Minister) told the House of Commons that 
"experience in the United State• has shown that individual states can retain 
fiscal powers without damaging the self-evident internal market that the 
United States as a whole posseases"18 
What is the truth of the matter? A number of points are relevant. 
a) In the us, there are no systematik controls on the movement of goods across 
State borders - indeed this is guaranteed by the Constitution. Nor is there 
any question of taxes on goods leaving a State being remitted, as is the 
present case with VAT in the Community. 
b) Sales Taxes are levied at both local and State level. Unlike VAT, these are 
charged at a single stage: to the final consumer. Raw materials and goods 
purchased for resale are therefore not taxed. However, since input taxation 
is not rebated, as in the case of VAT, there is some "pyramiding" (i.e. tax 
charged on tax), despite an exemption in some States for machinery. 
c) User taxes are in theory charged on out-of-State purchases. These are 
collected by the seller, if he does business in the State of delivery. If 
this is not possible, the purchaser is required to remit the tax. However, 
the only effective controls on compliance exist in the case of goods 
requiring registration: e.g. cars and boats. Otherwise enforcement is 
"sporadic"19, The growth of mail order has also caused particular problems 
of tax collection. Congress has even considered requiring mail order firms 
to register in every State from which they solicit sales. (This, of 
course, is how VAT will be applied in the Community). 
d) Alcohol and cigarette taxes are the only excises of any importance, and are 
levied on both a Federal and a State basis. Federal taxes have been 
increasing sharply in recent years, but are of course uniform in all 
States. State alcohol and cigarette taxes, by contrast, vary widely from 
State to State. The spread of rates is not as great as between the Member 
States of the European Community. On the other hand, the lowest rate of 
liquor tax is 25\ that of the highest, the lowest cigarette tax only 7.5\ 
of the highest. 
e) Consequently, there is an appreciable amount both of competition between 
States on tax rates, and attempted tax evasion. Both can be observed in the 
North-Eastern States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Hampshire, New 
York, Rhode Island, Vermont and Maine, the size and geographical 
relationship of which are similar to those in the Community. In 1983, for 
example, New York raised its cigarette taxes; Massachusetts, Connecticut, 
Vermont and New Hampshire followed suit within 4 months. 
Problems which might be instructive for the Community exist; in particular, on 
the border between Massachusetts and New Hampshire. New Hampshire, lacking a 
Sales Tax, is highly dependant on liquor and cigarette taxes, and is also 
18 Hansard 11 May 1988 Col.413/4. 
19 "Examination of the differences in US and state/local taxation as they 
relate to interstate commerce" by Michael Kuhn and Glenn w. White 
(Intertax 1986 No.S). 
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within easy driving distance of Massachusetts' major population centres. It 
has regularly tried to maintain a price advantage over its neighbours. 
In the case of cigarettes, the Massachusetts Department of Revenue has 
estimated that "for each 1 cent difference in the tax rate between 
Massachusetts and New Hampshire, Massachusetts loses 1.08 packs per capita 
annually. The 9 cent differential between the two states translates into a 
revenue loss of S 1 5. 1 million or 8% of Massachusetts' annual cigarette 
revenue" 20 . 
In the case of liquor taxes, the situation is complicated in that New 
Hampshire has a State monopoly on sales, which it exploits to raise revenue 
(c.f. the State tobacco monopolies in the Community). In the past there have 
been amazing scenes, as tax agents "travelled clandestinely across state 
borders to record the licence plate numbers of Massachusetts cars parked at 
New Hampshire liquor stores and make the drivers pay taxes on the alcohol they 
brought home" 21 . 
It is clear, therefore, that the United States has not avoided cross-border 
shopping problems. Despite the absence of border controls, attempts are made 
to enforce restrictions on the movement of excisable goods: for example, in 
the State of Maine, people who bring more than one case of beer, one gallon of 
wine and one gallon of liquor through toll booths in their cars face a fine of 
up to $500 or a prison sentence. The smuggling of tobacco from production 
centres like North Carolina (c.f. Greece) to high-tax markets, like New York, 
provides enforcement problems. 
It remains true that a spread of tax rates co-exists with open frontiers. "Tax 
trading" is limited by other means. 
1. SOME OTHER TAX ISSUES 
In the field of indirect taxation, the Commission's proposals to eliminate 
fiscal frontiers have understandably attracted the most attention. 
Nevertheless, other issues of some importance also remain to be resolved, 
notably in the field of VAT. 
Second-hand goods 
No decision has yet been reached, for example, on the crucial proposal 
covering second-hand goods, works of art, antiques and collector's items22. 
Under the 6th VAT Directive this matter should already have been resolved 
before 31 December 19771 
Travellgrs' allowances 
Even more serious is the failure of the Council to agree on the raising of 
travellers' allowances within the Community. In July 198923 the Commission 
20 "Massachusetts Economic Indicators" (Mass.Dept.of Revenue Jan.1987). 
21 See 'New York Times' 14 September 1986. 
22 See Parliament's Report by MR. PATTERSON and MR. VON WOGAU (A3-
0070/89). 
23 COM(89) 0331 final and COM(90) 0076 final. Parliament gave its opinion 
in the CASSIDY report on 23 November 1989 (A3-0061/89). 
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proposed that the existing levels should be quadrupled in a phased programme 
between 1990·and the end of 1992. (Even this was inadequate, given that any 
limitations on tax-paid purchases by final consumers will be absurd within the 
completed Single Market.) Yet progress has been systematically blocked by a 
number of Member States, most recently by Belgium. In the past, both Ireland 
and Denmark have been found by the Court to be in breach of Community Law 
through introducing "length-of-stay" restrictions on existing allowances. Both 
countries are seeking possible derogations from the Commission 1 s proposals, 
which in any case have already been watered down in Council discussions. 
"Duty-free" 
Quite separate from the issue of the duty-paid allowances, is that of "duty-
free". Tax-free shops at ports and airports (and duty-free sales on board 
ships or planes) are able to operate because the goods they sell are regarded 
as having been previously "exported". The Commission 1 s position is that the 
VAT and excise duty legislation will abolish the concept of "export" from 
intra-Community movements24. "Duty-free" will thus cease to exist. 
The abolition of duty-free in this way, however, could have some quite far-
reaching social and economic consequences. The income from tax-free shops, for 
example, comprises a large part of the revenue of airports and cross-Channel 
ferries, which would have to be made up by fare-increases. Since duty-free is 
widely considered one of the "perks" of package tours, Community countries 
might suffer a loss of trade. 
After 1992, it will of course be unacceptable to control duty-free sales 
through customs checks. If they are to continue, therefore, a system of 
"vendor-control" will have to introduced. 
~arities 
Under Article 13 of the 6th. VAT Directive a number of medical, welfare, 
educational and cultural public services are exempt from Value Added Tax. In 
certain categories, Member States are empowered to extend the exemption to 
"bodies other than those governed by public law", on the condition that they 
"shall not systematically aim to make a profit", are "managed and 
administered on an essentially voluntary basis", and are "not likely to create 
distortions of competition". 
~n so far as these provisions cover charities, they give rise to a number of 
problems. Firstly, the Directive yields only a limited definition of 
"charity". Secondly, normal activities have to separated from "commercial" 
fund-raising. And thirdly, the Directive gives charities only exemption, which 
means that they are generally unable to recoup VAT paid on their purchases. In 
some countries (e.g. the UK) the derogation permitting a zero rate does enable 
some input tax to be rebated; but there are fears that this right will be 
lost. Since charitable activities rarely have cross-frontier implications, one 
solution would be to allow charities the right to taxation at the lower-
including zero - rate, both on their own activities and on inputs. 
24 See Answer to Written Question No.2289/90 by MR PATTERSON. 
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